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compared to those funded when Housing and Urban Development
administered the program.
The states* shift in funding priorities seem to be
eroding the redistributive nature of this grant-in-aid
program, whose primary beneficiaries are the low and
moderate Income persons. Thus, this study underscores the
point that state and local governments are not politically
responsive to the needs of their economically disadvantaged
citizens; therefore, the federal government should again
assume the responsibility for the administration of the
program and establish priorities to be followed by the
localities.
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participatory observation, a variety of information obtained
from public documents, books, newspapers, journals and
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Distribution of Small Cities CDBG Funds
By Project Activity During HUD and
State Administration
I INTRODUCTION
In 1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act (0BRA81) in response to President Reagan's "Program for
Economic Recovery." This act consolidated over fifty
categorical grants into nine block grants,1 The Reagan
Administration's success in securing the enactment of this
act facilitated the President's primary objective in
domestic policy which seeks to reduce the role of the
federal government in intergovernmental policy and decision
making. Under the block grant approach, most of these grant
programs will now be under the administrative control of
state governments rather than federal agencies.
Under the Small Cities Community Development Block
Grant (CDBG), states may now assume the responsibility for
the administration of CDBG funds for nonentitlement areas
within their jurisdiction; otherwise Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) will continue to run the program as was
the case prior to the 1981 act. The statute which
authorized the states' program allows states a great degree
of flexibility to design their methods of distributing funds
and to establish the policies and procedures for their
^The nine consolidated block grants cover four in
health services, three in social services, one in education
and one in community development.
-1-
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program. By 1985, forty-seven states had accepted the
jurisdiction of the small cities program (only New York,
Maryland and Hawaii have not).
Since the states' takeover of CDBG, there have been
significant changes from previous HUD management. This
paper attempts to address Issues involved when Grant-in-aid
programs are shifted from national government's to state
governments' control with particular attention to the impact
of such a policy change on the low Income groups within the
communities. Low and moderate income groups are defined as
those whose income is below 50 percent and 80 percent of the
medium income family of the area.
II. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
Background of the Agency
Created in February 1981, the Office of Redevelopment
is run by the Community Development Office in Atlanta which
receives funds from HDD under the CDBG Program. The primary
responsibility is to prepare and implement specific plans
for redevelopment of specified areas in the City of Atlanta.
Its planning objective is:
The elimination and prevention of detrimental
development which, due to the area’s present
conditions and usages, retards the provision
of decent housing, thereby, constituting an
economic or social liability, and Impairing
the growth of the city.2
Therefore, the redevelopment power constitutes the only
mechanism by which the City can acquire private property for
non-public uses—that is, specifically for reselling to
private development enterprises in an effort to promote
economic development, thereby increasing financial stability
in the City by creating more jobs, and increasing the City's
tax base.
Implementation of the redevelopment program
encompasses the following major activities:
2city of Atlanta Summary of Economic and Community




Redevelopment, planning, programming and
budgeting;
Coordination of citizens business and
government Inputs;
Acquisition, condemnation, and demolition
of properties;
Interim management and leasing of
acquired property;
— Planning, coordinating and monitoring
public Infrastructure Improvements;
Provision of property site Improvements;
— Marketing of city-owned properties and
other properties having development
potential In the city;
-- Coordinating and maintaining liaison
activities; and
— Maintenance of redevelopment properties.3
In an effort to accomplish Its primary purpose, the
Office of Redevelopment undertakes three main actions. The
first Is a comprehensive marketing campaign known as
Decision Atlanta which Is used to encourage private Invest¬
ments In the City of Atlanta, specifically on the properties
owned by the City. However, the Office of Redevelopment
also acts as a referral and coordinating service for the
development of private properties which satisfy Individual
developer's needs. The second action Is the development of
a diversified method for the disposition of redevelopment
properties. The third major action Is what Is called the
3lbld
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"one stop development process," Because the newly
reorganized Department of Community Development (DCD), which
is responsible for all aspects related to the planning
(rezoning, land sale, and construction permitting of new
development), the DCD has established a mechanism to assist
potential developers from an initial conceptual meeting
through the completion of the development project. Thus,
the Office of Redevelopment plays an integral role in the
coordination process.4
In short, the main goal of the Office of Redevelop¬
ment is to plan, program, and Implement specific activities
for the physical, social, and economic development of
designated areas within the City of Atlanta. Hence, its
primary activities are centered around the acquisition of
properties, the relocation of business and residents, the
management, leasing and demolition of acquired properties,
the planning, coordinating and monitoring of public improve¬
ments, the marketing sales of properties, and the monitoring
of construction activities in redevelopment areas.
Internship Experience
Under the sponsorship of an educational grant from
HUD, the writer served as an intern in the Office of
Redevelopment from September 1984 to April 1986,
^Ibid., pp, 3-4
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While serving as an intern, the writer's primary
duties, inter alia included the determination of parcel
ownership, verification of records of titles, easements,
appraisal, and tax record information in preparation for
negotiations, and taking an inventory of all properties and
implementing marketing programs for each site for develop¬
ment by private developers. The writer also assisted the
Redevelopment Property Specialist in locating prospective
developer and helping them understand redevelopment sales
procedures. The tasks also involved processing purchase
proposals received, negotiating and preparing sales for
closing, thus serving as liaison to the developer during
land sales process.
Working under a HUD sponsored agency expanded the
writer's knowledge on the operation of block grants,
particularly the CDBG and hence the interest to carry out a
study on the impact of decentralizing grant-in-aid programs
with emphasis on small cities CDBG,
Statement of the Problem
Small cities CDBG has now been under state control
for at least three years. The states' takeover of this
block grant program provides an opportunity to consider the
effects of decentralization in the national government
system. Specifically, by moving the allocation process from
the national government level to the subnational level, the
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small cities program provides one of the clearest tests of
potential conflict between national purposes and local
autonomy. Even though CDBG as a block grant was designed to
permit local governments considerable discretion is design¬
ing and formulating projects and activities to benefit low
and moderate Income groups, there is no doubt that the
program was intended to be redistributive. Thus, the states
were expected to remain faithful to the law’s basic purposes
but were permitted considerable latitude in diversifying an
overall program to accomplish those ends,5
However, the legislations authorizing states'
assumption of CDBG Imposes few restrictions on what states
may do. The law requires that states give "maximum feasible
priority" to meeting the two basic objectives of the 1974
Community Development Act—that is, benefit low and moderate
income families and prevent slums and blight. Regardless of
this provision, such a change allows significant latitude
for small cities grant program to reflect the preferences
and priorities of state and local officials,®
By minimizing federal control and maximizing local
autonomy, many scholars and politicians urge that this is a
return to the past rather than the path for the future. In
®David R. Morgan and R,E. England, "The Small Cities
Block Grant Program: An Assessment of Programmatic Change




the years around the turn of the century, urban problems for
example—physical decay, overcrowding, racial conflict, and
inefficient local governments—were regarded as responsi¬
bilities for the state and local authorities, but not for
the federal government. It was not until the Great
Depression of the 1930s that the federal government
attempted to directly confront the problems of the nation's
cities. This was highlighted in the Housing Act of 1949
when the federal government for the first time identified
its objective as the provision of a decent home and suitable
living environment for all Americans. The Preamble of the
act declared that
. . . the general welfare and security of the
nation and the health and living standards of
its people require housing production and
related community developments sufficient to
remedy the serious housing shortage, the
elimination of substandard and other inade¬
quate housing through the clearance of slums
and other blighted areas and the realization
as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent
home and suitable living environment for every
American family, thus contributing to the
development and redevelopment of
community . . . .*^
Since then, the federal government has embarked on wide¬
spread support of housing and community development
activities to ensure that its redistributive policies are
carried out. Decentralization of CDBG therefore can be
looked at as a way of the national government seeking to
"^Omnibus Housing Act of 1949, Pub. Law 171, 81st
cong., 1st sess., 1919, p. 1.
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abrogate its domestic responsibilities, especially to the
economically disadvantaged people and communities.
Many studies clearly indicate the incompatibility of
the state and the federal government’s priorities. For
instance, a survey carried out by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) in 1983 revealed that there is a general
decline in the number of low and moderate residents
benefiting from community development activities, largely
due to the fact that the states are now shifting funds away
from housing rehabilitation activities to public improve¬
ments and economic development.®
Therefore, the key question to be analyzed is whether
the states' assumption of small cities CDBG defeats the
national purpose for enacting the grant program—that is,
specifically to benefit low and moderate income families
while placing emphasis on decentralization as it relates to
redistribution, and its impact on low and moderate Income
families.
®U.S. General Accounting Office, "States Are Making
Good Progress in Implementing the Small Cities Community
Development Block Grant Program" (Washington, D.C., Govern¬
ment Printing Office, September 1983), p. 20.
III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Concern about community development priorities
between the federal and the state governments is not new.
It has spawned numerous theoretical studies. While it is
not possible to cover all significant literature related to
the states' governments, political responsiveness as
compared to the federal government, what is offered here is
a brief historical background and development of CDBG, and a
summary of literature and related empirical data.
Historical Background and Political Development
The Community Development Grant Program enacted in
1974 as amended in 1977 and 1981 consolidated several
housing and urban renewal programs into Community
Development Block Grants.^ Entitled communities—that is,
central cities of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA's) or
other cities in MSA's with 50,000 or more population, and
urban counties of over 200,000 in population were entitled
to a yearly formula grant based on objective needs factors.
Under the 1974 Act, as amended, the CDBG funds allocated to
entitled communities was based on population, overcrowding,
^Consolidated Housing and Urban Renewal Programs were
Model Cities, Water and Sewer Facilities, Open Space,
Neighborhood Facilities, Rehabilitation Loan.
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and poverty (double weighted), or from a "hold-harmless"
average of the displaced categorical grants received during
the period of 1968 to 1972. The 1974 law also provided that
"hold-harmless" entitlements would be phased out between
1978 and 1980. Approximately thirty percent of the funds
were available to cities of less than 50,000 in population
(commonly known as small cities), and were distributed on a
competitive basis.
The primary objective of Title I as stipulated in
this act is:
. . . development of variable urban
communities by providing decent housing and a
suitable living environment and expanding
economic opportunities, principally for
persons of low and moderate Income families.^0
Consistent with the primary objective, the federal
assistance provided by this program is meant for the support
of community development activities directed toward the
following specific objectives:
1) The elimination of slums and blight and
the prevention of blighting, influence
and the deterioration of property and
neighborhood and the community facilities
of importance to the welfare of the
community, principally for persons of low
and moderate incomes;
2) The elimination of conditions which are
detrimental to the health, safety, and
public welfare, through code enforcement.
lOflousing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.
Law 93-383, United States Statutes at Large, 93rd Congress,
2d sess., Vol. 99, 1974, p. 635.
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demolition, interim rehabilitation
assistance and related activities;
3) The conservation and expansion of the
nation's housing stock in order to
provide a decent home and a suitable
living environment for all persons but
principally those of low and moderate
incomes;
4) The expansion and improvement of the
quality and quantity of the community
services, principally for persons of low
and moderate incomes, which are essential
for sound community development of viable
urban communities;
5) A more rational utilization of land and
other natural resources and a better
arrangement of residential, commercial,
industrial, recreational and other needed
activity centers;
6) The reduction of the isolation of income
group within communities and geographical
areas and promotion of an increase in
this diversity and vitality of neighbor¬
hoods through spatial disconcentration of
housing opportunity for persons of lower
Incomes, and the revitalization of
deteriorated neighborhoods to attract
persons of higher incomes;
7) The restoration and preservation of
properties of special value of historic,
architectural or esthetic reasons; and
8) The alleviation of physical and economic
distress through the stimulation of
private investment and community revital¬
ization in areas with population out¬
migration and stagnating or declining tax
base.
Thus, the central purpose of the CDBG program was to
transfer substantial decision-making authority from federal
lllbid
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to local officials and to provide the latter with more
flexibility in the use of the funds. Even though decentral¬
ization was to be the procedural goal of the block grant,
the 1974 legislation also included substantive goals aimed
at eliminating or preventing slums and blight, assuring that
the primary beneficiaries were low and moderate income
group; and taking care of local needs of particular urgency
because existing conditions pose a serious and immediate
threat to the health and welfare of a community in the
absence of other financial resources to meet such needs.
HUD’S concern for the substantive goals began to
appear as early as the second program year during the
administration of President Ford. However, it was during
President Carter’s administration that HUD officials made
the explicit choice to escalate substantially the federal
role in the program and put strong emphasis on substance,
thereby giving the highest priority to social targeting.12
This was expressed soon after the Carter Administration took
office when the new HUD secretary,, Patricia R. Harris, told
a senate committee:
The basic administration machinery is now in
place. It is time to determine if the funds
12paul R. Dommel, M.J. Rich, and Leonard Rubinowitz,
Decentralizing Community Development (Report to the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1983), pp. 13-
16. For more information on targeting policy, see Paul R.
Dommel, Targeting Community Development, Department of
Housing and Urban Development (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1980), pp. 9-18.
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are being spent to carry out a clear strategy:
Are they being used primarily to benefit low-
and moderate-income persons?
Thus, local accountability for the use of CDBG funds was
defined in terms of the substantive national objectives, and
more particularly, social targeting.
The vigorous escalation of activities during Carter’s
administration towards social targeting caused many local
officials to complain that
. . . such "expansionism" impinges on the
greater local discretion they expected from
the block grant and frequently intrudes into
what they regard as traditionally local
prerogatives.
A study conducted by Paul Dommel also indicate that HUD's
social targeting policy did result in a higher level of
direct benefits to low and moderate-income groups,
However, the increasing Involvement of the federal
government in the administration of CDBG came to a halt by
the entrance of President Reagan.
The Reagan Administration came into office advocating
federal decentralization of a wide range of domestic
l^Houslng and Community Development Legislation of
1977, Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs. S.S. Senate, 95th Cong., 1st sess., April
18, 1977, p. 114.
l^Paul R. Dommel, et al.. Targeting Community
Development, Department of Housing and Urban Development




policies, including CDBG. President Reagan's decentraliza¬
tion had two principal elements--adininistrative and
legislative. Administrative decentralization was imple¬
mented through fewer and more flexible regulations and
guidelines, while legislative decentralization primarily
came through the elimination in the law of the CDBG
application process.It was during this time that
Congress passed the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981
(0BRA81) under which states assumed the administration of
small cities CDBG.
The 0BRA81 abolished the formal CDBG application
process and substituted the requirement that a recipient
provide a final statement of community development
objectives and projected use of funds. Therefore, HUD did
not issue a new set of formal regulations establishing any
administrative procedures to be followed by local government
in preparing their submissions. More generally, legislative
elimination of the application process removed major
potential leverage HUD had in its authority to say "no" to
an entire application or individual activities within it.
It should be noted that HUD had used the application process
not necessarily to control local planning but to influence
it. Therefore, the Reagan Administration wished to end this
federal influence and to leave development strategy to local
l®Ibid., pp. 19-20
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partlcipants in the decision-making process. Even though
the 1981 changes did not alter the three national objectives
but in ending the application process, the new law shifted
the locus of expressing any preference among the three
national objectives from HUD to local officials.17
Literature and Related Empirical Data
In his book Metropolis against Itself,1^ Woods urges
that decentralization leads to inefficiencies and
diseconomies of political fragmentation leading to urban
sprawl. Inadequate open spaces, congested schools and
mediocre administration. The disparities in the quality of
life and public services between the central and suburban
areas of the fragmented metropolis has attracted a good deal
of criticism from American theorists on decentralization.
Literature on decentralization has focused on two key
questions: Are the states and localities administratively
capable of running effective programs, and are they
politically responsive to the same values as the federal
government? Underlying this question is a belief that state
and local officials have a biased and vested interest in
local politics and decision making. This creates an air of
distrust of state and local officials to take care of the
17ibid., p. 21.
1®R,C, Woods, Metropolis against Itself (New York:
Doubleday, 1959), pp. 39-45.
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problems of the socially and economically disadvantaged
people. According to Dommel in his book The Politics of
Revenue Sharing, he notes that:
This distrust of state and local officialdom
was not without historical support. In our
pluralistic society, organized interest have
always been more successful in operating in
the political and economic arenas than have
the disorganized or unorganized elements, the
economic and political havenots.^®
While this may be true at all levels of government, the
major advances that have been made by the disadvantaged
groups over the past fifty years have come by elevating
decision making to the national level. This is evident by
the social welfare emphasis of the national government.
Standing out is the case of civil rights, where remedy could
only be found through intervention by national institutions
such as the Supreme Court.2® Closely related is the study
by Schattschneider on democracy in America. He urges that
the more narrow the scope of political conflict, the more
likely the system will produce policies benefiting organized
groups and maintaining the status quo. Since the most
powerful interest is to keep decision narrowly circum¬
scribed, he contends that it becomes the function of the
public authority to enlarge the scope of conflict, in
effect, to widen the decision-making arena. For the have-
1®P.R. Dommel, The Politics of Revenue Sharing
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 35.
2®Ibid.
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not group in the United States, the efforts to broaden the
decision-making arena have inevitably meant appealing to the
national government.21 For example, it took the Supreme
Court's decision to integrate public schools over the fierce
opposition of many state and local officials.
In their article in the Public Administration Review,
Morgan and England support this theory by quoting W.H,
Riker, who writing during the 1960s Civil Rights Movement
argued that historically the main beneficiary of federalism
in the United States was the southern segregationists who
were given the freedom to oppress black people.22
Ultimately of course, federal government intervention was
essential to overcome the resistance of state and local
officials. Riker's view on U.S. federalism is based on an
analysis showing that in practice major policy decisions
made by sub-national units are invariably minority decisions
tending to favor privileged groups such as large businesses
and land owners, which Impose high external costs on the
national majority.23
Thus, literature supports the argument that a state
or local government can be less responsive than a
21e.E. Schattschnelder, The Semi-Sovereign People
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 39-40.




centralized government to popular needs. Therefore, the
greater the degree of decentralization, the less likely the
community will pursue its redistributive policies. Now, the
question to ask is whether there are related studies and
empirical support for this view of the events characterizing
national-local relations.
A study conducted by Lazin and Aroni on the sub¬
sidized housing program in Los Angeles shows the reluctance
of federal officials to oppose local policies even if they
conflict with federal regulation or law. Once national
policies conflict with sub-national interest, it is
difficult for the national government to achieve greater
equity or social targeting.24
Regarding revenue sharing, Caputo and Cole noted that
allocation of such funds promote very little redistribution.
Such spending has been largely conservative and status quo
oriented, heavily favoring traditional services with such
areas as health and social services receiving relatively
small portions.25 studies carried out by Paul R. Dommel of
the Brookings Institute show that when President Carter's
officials expressed a clear policy preference among the
24Fred Lazin and Samuel Aroni, "Federalism Low Income
Housing Policies and the Myth of Centralized Power," Policy
Studies Review Vol. 3 (1981):62-66.
25David A. Caputo and Richard L. Cole, Urban Politics
and Decentralization (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath
Company, 1974), p. 153.
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three national objectives, choosing social targeting as
their highest priority, among a group of forty-one sample
cities, the estimated level of benefits to low and moderate
income groups increased from fifty-six to sixty-two percent.
Apparently, it was necessary for HUD to bring pressure on a
number of cities to increase the share of CDBG funding for
lower Income residents.26
26paul R. Dommel, M.J. Rich and Leonard Rubinowitz,
Deregulating Community Development (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1983), pp. 13-
17.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The methodological approach used in this paper is
descriptive analysis. This serves our attempt to analyze
the effects of decentralizing CDBG on the largest population
and whether the state and local governments are politically
responsive to the same values as the federal government.
In this effort, both primary and secondary sources
were utilized. The primary sources were obtained through
observation while the writer served as an intern in the
Office of Redevelopment in the City of Atlanta, While
there, the writer conducted interviews with Ms, Evelyn
Nu'man, a financial analyst who was able to assist the
writer in determining the general expenditure of CDBG funds
within the City of Atlanta. Other interviews were also
conducted with Ms, Susan McGee from the Department of
Community Affairs of the State of Georgia, who supplied data
which along with other sources was used in the assessment of
local uses of funds committed to small cities CDBG. Other
date sources were drawn from HUD's annual report to the
Congress who obtains their information from annual reports
which each state is obligated to file concerning the actual
use of CDBG funds.
-21-
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Secondary data were extracted from a variety of
sources, which included journals, especially Public
Administration Review and Policy Studies Journal,
newspapers, books, pamphlets, and correspondence with the
Council of State Community Affairs Agencies that compiles
data on states issues including CDBG.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
Enactment of the OBRA81 and institution of a series
of decentralizing initiatives produced potentially signifi¬
cant changes in small cities CDBG. In assuming control of
the program, a state must agree to two basic conditions:
(1) to continue to fund HUD’s previously approved multi-year
projects, and (2) to adhere to the primary national objec¬
tives of the CDBG Act, Apart from these two requirements,
states were given the freedom to develop purposes and
procedures for distributing funds as state and local
priorities dictate. Proponents of President Reagan
administration's decentralization policy of CDBG seem to
share a general view that Increased flexibility in the
program has been rightfully turned to the states because
. . . states and local governments are the
recipients of greater flexibility and
discretion, particularly when they are allowed
to spend federal grant money on their estab¬
lished priorities, carry out regulatory and
administrative functions formerly belonging to
the federal government, and develop their own
consultation processes. In* short, these
governments are better able to tailor these
kinds of activities tp their unique state and
local needs. Furthermore, decentralization of
the regulatory role of government serves to
fix political responsibility and account¬
ability, That is, citizens will have a better
-23-
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idea as to where responsibility is lodged and to whom
inputs should be directed. . . .27
Whereas it may be true that state and local
governments understand their local needs better than the
national government, the key issues to be raised and
analyzed are whether state and local governments’ priorities
are compatible with those of the national government. Can
state and local governments act in good faith and adhere to
the primary objective of the Housing and Community Develop¬
ment Act of 1974 which clearly states that the principle
beneficiaries should be low and moderate income persons?
Has housing rehabilitation that provides direct benefits to
such group given way to development projects in which
politically connected investors are the primary benefi¬
ciaries instead of the intended group?
Initial analysis of the effects of states assumptions
of small cities CDBG clearly indicate that spending
priorities have shifted since 1982 when the states took over
the administration of the program. As Table I indicates,
some significant changes have occurred in the types of
projects funded by the states. This shift, in funding of
projects was expected due to the fact previous studies
indicate that, if given the opportunity, state and local
officials will push for funding of their defined priorities.
27j, Edwin Benton, "American Federalism’s First
Principles and Reagan’s New Federalism Policies," Policy
Studies Journal Vol. 13 (March 1985);571-573.
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TABLE I
Distribution of Small Cities CDBG Funds by
Project Activity During HUD and
State Administration








Housing 33% 17% 16%
Public Works/
Facilities 38% 37% 29%
Economic
Development 4% 18% 14%
Multipurpose









Source: Adopted from Eric B. Herzlk and J.P Pelissero
"Decentralization, Redistribution and Community Development:
A Reassessment of the Small Cities CDBG Program"; Public
Administration Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January/February
1986):33.
♦Includes Puerto Rico.
Note: Many states have adopted HUD's funding system of
providing two main funding competitions: Single Activity
Grant which is designed to address and resolve a specific
community need within one of the three problem areas,
namely, housing, public works/facilities and economic
development. An application must consist of one activity or
a set of activities. However, all activities must address
one of the problem areas. Multi-activity grants allows the
applicants to address identified community needs in a
comprehensive manner. Multi-activity applications must
contain two or more activities and address needs in more
than one of the problem areas mentioned above.
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And what are they? A 1978 HUD study of the development
needs of small cities shows that local officials ranked
public facilities as their first priority for improvement.28
In 1982-83, the General Accounting Office (GAO) studied
seven states to see what changes might result from state
approved projects. In six of the states GAO reported
declines in the number of low and moderate income people
benefiting from CDBG funds. The decrease was largely caused
by the fact states were shifting funds from housing
rehabilitation to public improvements and economic
development. The average decline in percentage of lower
income groups assisted was 13 percent,29
It is not the intend of the researcher to suggest
that public improvements are disadvantageous to lower income
groups. Indeed the financially less well-off groups would
be the beneficiaries if such projects lie within a
neighborhood that has deteriorated, or is facing blighted
conditions; and sometimes, such is the case in some older
cities. But by and large, public works projects are more
likely to be area wide projects; thus, denying direct
benefits to lower income groups.
28u,s. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Consolidated Annual Report to Congress on Community Develop¬
ment Programs (Washington, D.C., April 1983), p, 46.
29u,S. General Accounting Office, 1983, p. 20.
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In 1981 while the program was still under HUD,
housing received one-third of the small cities CDBG funds.
However, housing activities which provided direct benefits
to the economically depressed are giving way to development
projects. A survey carried out by the Council of State
Community Affairs Agencies (COSCAA) in 1984 reported that
small towns received most state CDBG infrastructure awards.
The analysis based on 36 states operating the CDBG in 1982
and 1983 also found a sizeable percentage of the CDBG awards
were for water (23.6 percent) or sewer (13.5 percent)
projects.30 This confirms other research findings that
small communities often have problems funding water and
sewer improvements. In fact, repairing of water works
systems and transportation is a problem that is facing the
nation as a whole. A report released by the Joint Economic
Committee (JEC) on the nation's water works and transporta¬
tion system February 1984 reaffirmed that there is:
. . • a vast gap between needs for improve¬
ments and the money available to pay for
them. ... It would take $1.2 trillion
between now and the year 2000 to keep up with
the nation's infrastructure. Expected
revenues from all sources in that period for
infrastructure work, meanwhile amount to $710
billion.31
30''Small Towns Received Most State Community Develop¬
ment Infrastructure Grants," Housing and Development Report
Vol. 12 (June 1984):69.
3lRobert Rothman, "Hill Politics Delay Repair of
'American Ruins'," Congressional Quarterly Vol. 42
(September 1984):213B.
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Finally, a study of eight small Missouri communities
reported CDBG funds had become a virtual subsidy for local
public works.32
Economic development activities have always
consistently accounted for a relatively small percentage of
most small communities CDBG grant spending. But as Table 1
Indicates, funds allocated for economic development spending
has more than tripled since 1981. Two main reasons can be
cited for this increase. First, facing severe unemployment
and tax base erosion, many states have chosen to emphasize
economic development in the administration of the small
cities CDBG.33 Secondly, during the 1970s when the block
grant was enacted, it was one of the various federal
programs intended for rehabilitation and economic develop¬
ment in cities. But the Reagan administration's budget cuts
have either eliminated or substantially slashed the avail¬
able funds for economic development. While the small cities
CDBG has not entirely escaped the piercing budget machete,
it has barely been spared (Reagan's latest budget proposes
further cuts from CDBG funds). As the other funds have
dried up, "Cities increasingly have looked to the economic
32Gerald T. Gabris and B.J. Reed, "Responses of
Cities to Federal Aid Decentralization: Community
Development," Southern Review of Public Administration Vol.
2 (December 1978):301-324.
33state CDBG Update Vol. 4 (Council of State
Community Affairs Agencies, January 1984), p. 1.
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development aspects of the block grant program as an
alternative,"34
It is a general belief of the decentralization foes
that the quality of life in an inner city is an important
determinant of company relocation decisions. After all, a
major concern of companies when considering a possible
location is whether or not a candidate city will be
attractive enough for its white-collar employees. For this
reason, use of CDBG funds to reduce crime and rehabilitate
deteriorated neighborhoods is an integral part of a city's
economic development program.35 However, a survey by Dommel
of the Brookings Institute shows that economic activities
provide fewer direct benefits to low and moderate income
persons than other community development activities like
housing or public facilities due to the fact that CDBG
supported jobs do not have to go directly to low and
moderate income people but only be available to such groups.
Furthermore, the research indicates that economic develop¬
ment activities benefit community developers and business
owners more than lower-income people. 36 in ©ne city in
Georgia, there are several documented cases where local
residents were promised jobs after companies relocated
34The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 2 March 1986.
35ibid.
36Doiunjei ^ Rich and Rublnowitz, Deregulating Community
Development, pp, 151-152,
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buslnesses in their neighborhoods. But as it turned out,
most of the businesses brought their own personnel and made
no effort to hire local residents who were intended to be
the principal beneficiaries of such CDBG supported economic
developments.37 Such practices are not limited to any
particular area because it seems a general practice as
previously stated that, most state and local officials are
not politically responsive to the needs of the economically
disadvantaged.
While it is also true that states have undertaken
some significant steps by increasing the number of
communities that receive CDBG funds (an increase of 75
percent); however, the amount of grants awarded have dropped
from an average of $485,000 to $219,000.38 What this
increase simply means is that more communities are now
receiving the grant under state administration than when HUD
ran the program. However, given that HDD does not have data
on any year after 1982 that documents whether the funds
expended met the program's national objectives simply shows
that the federal oversight of the program is minimal. HDD
officials Instead rely on grant recipients in determining
whether benefits promised to the poor were delivered. Even
now, reports show that information is not as easily
37Atlanta Journal and Constitution. 2 March 1986.
33u.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1983 Consolidated Annual Report, pp. 45-46.
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avallable as it used to be due to the fact that revision of
regulations changed the reporting requirements for grant
recipients requiring less detail on project benefits
reports. This also Indicates that even if HUD strengthened
reporting regulations, it would still have a tough time
monitoring CDBG program benefits. Figures show that whereas
the agency had a staff of 1,899 to monitor grants in 1981,
it expects to have only 799 in 1987.39
Consequences of inadequacy in monitoring the program
can be cited in an example of a problem that occurred in
Missoula, Montana where the Sheraton hotel chain secured a
federal grant to use in building a new hotel. To get the
grant the company promised that it would request local
agencies to aid in locating locally qualified poor minority
workers to fill at least 10 of 150 permanent Jobs to be
created. The National Citizens Monitoring Project, a non¬
profit watchdog group reported that the company neither
filled the 10 vacancies with poor minorities nor contracted
local agencies as promised.^®
Whereas it may be true that decentralization of the
regulatory role of the federal government may surface and
fix political responsibility and accountability, whereby
citizens have a clear idea as to who is responsible, and to
39Atlanta Journal and Constitution. 2 March 1986.
40ibid
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whom inputs should be directed, studies have determined that
by and large this is not the case in small cities. However,
unlike small localities, large cities which consist of
greater neighborhood diversity and more politically active
groups are more likely to be interested in specific neigh¬
borhood projects.In addition, officials in small cities
have a greater position of influence and tend to succeed in
promoting their priorities with little resistance from the
local residents.
^^Morgan and England, "The Small Cities Block Grant
Program," 1984.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study shows a significant difference between HUD
administration and state administration of the small cities
CDBG. States are increasingly eroding the redistributive
nature of this grant program, and replacing it with their
well established local priorities. History shows the
states’ inclination not to assist its economically
disadvantaged citizens and given this fact, one must wonder
why the federal government has decided to minimize its
control over the program.
Historically, the economically disadvantaged group in
the United States have been forced to turn to the federal
government for assistance. Now if the national government
has altered the rules by assigning the administration of
this redistributive program to those who turned a deaf ear
to the needs of this particular group, is this not a return
to the past?
The political reality in this country clearly
demonstrates that the low and moderate income groups are
less well-organized than the rich. And if politicians are
responsive to the needs of the rich who are able to articu¬
late their demands to the power structure, then it is quite
obvious that the needs of the poor and low income groups
-33-
-34-
will be disregarded. The findings of this study as well as
numerous others underscore the fact that the federal
government should again assume responsibility for the
administration of the program and establish the priorities
to be followed by the localities. Unless this happens, the
local officials as in the past will continue to ignore the
needs of the low Income groups who were initially Intended
to be served by the Community Development Block Grant
Program.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
After discussion of the effects of decentralizing
small cities CDBG and the negative impact on the low Income
group, the following actions have been recommended to
alleviate the problem:
1) The federal government should end its
decentralization policy and assume the
responsibility for readmlnlsterlng the
program.
2) The federal government should Increase
its field personnel to monitor the
effectiveness of the program, in essence
assuring that it is benefiting the
targeted group.
3) In the event that the above recommenda¬
tions are not adopted, then the CDBG
program should be abolished all together.
It has been compromised and has lost its
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